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data provided by the ECB and the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
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implied volatility of stock market movements.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis, with its beginning dated roughly around 2008, now turns five. Start-
ing as a subprime mortgage crisis, it evolved into ever expanding dimensions. Therefor
the European Central Bank (ECB) as well as the Federal Reserve (Fed) face a multi-
plicity of challenges.
A great problem central banks face is uncertainty. Additionally, as a consequence
of turmoil, market participants might change their usual behavior with the effect of a
break up of established transmissions. So, while uncertainty might be a general problem,
it becomes of special interest during times of turmoil (González-Páramo 2008).
Market expectations are an important tool to gain insight into the private market
assessment of key macro variables. The importance of expectations to control any system
or economy properly has been highlighted very early (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro
and Gordon 1983). A wrong appraisal of expectations could generate serious problems
as it may, accidentally, dampen or amplify central bank actions. Since expectations can
not be observed directly, they need to be extracted from the data. To get an idea of
how market participants expect future values to be, surveys as well as stock market data
can be a valuable source of information (ECB 2011). Both indices are forward-looking.
Survey measures catch expectations as they explicitly account for the expected values of
key variables for different horizons ahead. On the other hand, stock market data covers
future expectations as it is one of the main determinants of today’s asset values.
This paper aims to extract common global factors that drive the development of
uncertainty within the Euro Zone as well as the Unites States (US). This extractions is
done with the help of factor analysis, a tool to reduce the complexity of data in order to
present it in a more convenient way.
Past works on capturing expectations and identifying uncertainty via stock market or
survey based measures can be found, for example, in Galati et al. (2009); Giordani and
Söderlind (2003); Söderlind (2008). However, to my knowledge, there is no work which
includes the latest developments of the financial crisis. Additionally, with the exception
of Geiger et al. (2009), who cover at least European developments, there is no treatment
of the Euro Zone or a joint analysis of both regions.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents general methods of identifying
uncertainty. Those measures can be grouped into survey based measures and stock mar-
ket based measures. Afterwards, those measures are mapped with the data in section 3
and 4. Section 5 covers the factor analysis constricted to the European data set. Sec-
tion 6 conducts the factor analysis with respect to US data. Finally, section 7 combines
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European and US data to perform a global factor analysis with the goal of identifying
global uncertainty forces. Section 8 concludes.
2 Measuring Uncertainty
There are several classifications and forms of uncertainty, such as data or parametric
uncertainty. For each of those forms, methods have been developed to cope with un-
certainty. Most prominent, the approach of Brainard (1967) has become conventional
wisdom (for example, Blinder 1998).
Nevertheless, working with uncertainty presumes the identification of uncertainty. Of
special interest is thus, the perception of future values by market participants. The im-
portance of expectations for the conduct of monetary policy has been highlighted by
several authors, see, e.g., ECB (2006, 2009, 2011). The wrong assessment of market
expectations on behalf of the central bank could cause serious problems as it possibly
amplifies or dampens her actions in an unexpected manner. Hence, measuring uncer-
tainty means primarily, measuring expectations.
In order to reveal possible uncertainty on behalf of market participants, variables need
to be utilized to obtain the required information. Measuring uncertainty is done mainly
in two ways. The first of them is based on surveys such as the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) provided by the ECB and FRB of Philadelphia. The second measure
relies on stock market data, more precisely on option volatility.
2.1 Measuring Uncertainty via Surveys
Surveys on the perception of the future development of key macro variables have a long
tradition in measures of uncertainty (see for example Leduc et al. 2009; Galati et al.
2009). For the Euro area, this survey is provided by the ECB, since 1990 the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has been conducting this survey for the US, respectively.
During this time various changes have occurred. For example, different forecast horizons
have been added or dropped. Hence, computable data of the ECB is available only since
2001 whereas US data reaches back till the late sixties.1
Depending on the specific form of the questionnaire, different forms of measurement
can be deduced. Taking for example the European survey, up to 90 institutions are asked
to give their specific perception of the future development of inflation, GDP growth, and
unemployment for the next years on a quarterly basis. The relevant forecast horizons
1 An overview of the European survey is given by Bowles et al. (2007). Respectively, Croushore (1993,
2010) are good manuals for the American survey.
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are: inflation for the current year, inflation for the next year, inflation 4 quarters ahead,
inflation 8 quarters ahead, and inflation 5 years ahead. Hence horizon one, two, and five
are “static” as it can be assumed that a forecast concerning the current year will improve
as the year passes by. This does not hold for the forecast horizons 3 and 4. They are
constructed as “rolling window”. In order to obtain constant forecast data, which is not
depended on the inquiry date, only horizon 3, 4 and 5 are taken into account for further
analysis. Figure 1 demonstrates the timing using an example vintage of the European
survey.
date of survey current year next year 1 year rolling 2 year rolling 5 years
2003 Q1 2003 2004 Dec 2003 Dec 2004 2007
2003 Q2 2003 2004 March 2004 March 2005 2007
2003 Q3 2003 2004 June 2004 June 2005 2008
2003 Q4 2003 2004 Sept 2004 Sept 2005 2008
Table 1: Forecast Horizon SPF, ECB
Uncertainty about the development of each variable is typically deduced by its stan-
dard deviation (Giordani and Söderlind 2003). Unfortunately, forecast horizon are not
coherent. Neither across the US and Euro data nor within one region. This is to some
extent due to the specific nature of each variable. Unemployment as well as inflation
data, for example, are available on a monthly basis whereas GDP data is only available
on a quarterly basis. On the other hand, the US survey takes various variables into
account that are not even inquired by the ECB, for example, expectations about real
consumption, new housings or corporate profits. To obtain a comparable picture of the
US and Euro data, I rely on a subset of each survey. The present data set deals with
these difficulties quite well.
2.2 Measuring Uncertainty via Stock Market Volatility
Another way of identifying uncertainty is the use of options. For a call option, only if
the current value of the underlying asset exceeds the strike price of the asset the holder
of the option will make use of his right, because only in this case the value of the option
is positive. Otherwise, if the current price falls below the strike price the value of the
option is zero as it merely guarantees the holder to buy the underlying at a higher price
than the market price. Thus, the price of an option is open ended in one direction as
it rises with the underlying asset, but it is chopped off at the bottom as it can not be
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worth less than zero. This effect is even more developed if more than one price change
is allowed (Hull 2009; Neely 2005).
Why Higher Volatility Leads to a Higher Option Price
Any option is worthless, if the underlying asset’s price does not change. No agent needs
to buy an option which gives him the right to buy or sell the underlying asset at a certain
price if there will be no possible price change in the future at all. If price changes occur
according to some public formula, again, the respective option would be worthless as
everybody would merely calculate the future price of the underlying asset.
Hence, an option attains its value due to the uncertainty of future price developments.
Supposing two call options for two different underlyings with a different variance but
the same mean and an equally distributed probability of future states, both options can
not be worth less than zero. Therefore, the option with the higher variance must gain a
higher price as it offers a potentially greater payoff with the same downside risk.
Implied Volatility
The volatility at one point in time is not observable. Of course, it can be estimated
using past observations. However, in reality, most market participants make use of the
so-called implicit volatility. The Black-Scholes formula determines the price of an option
as a function of its strike price, the underlying asset value, the risk-free interest rate, the
time to expiry, and its variance (Black and Scholes 1972, 1973). Except for the variance,
σ, all variables are observable. Hence, one can calculate the volatility which is necessary
to match the current market price of the option. In contrast to historical volatilities,
implied volatilities are forward-looking, they include expectations and assumptions of
market participants about future stock movements. For the further work, I use the
implicit volatility index VSTOXX for the European market and the VIX for the US
market.
3 Uncertainty measured by survey data
3.1 European Survey Data
This section provides an illustration of the survey data of the European as well as the
American survey of professional forecasters.
A closer look at the European survey data reveals that all variables show more or
less the same pattern during the last decade and especially during the beginning of the
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financial crisis around 2008 with the fall of Lehman Brothers. The standard deviations
of all three variables (GDP, inflation and unemployment) have become larger during the
financial crisis, whereas they have been relatively low in the years before. This holds –
even though to a different extent – for all forecast horizons. An exception is the long
term (5 years) forecast of unemployment which was relatively high even in the years
before 2008 and, compared to other forecast horizons, did not really recover in the years
after the peak. Figure 1 captures these developments for the forecast horizons rolling 1
year (1y), rolling two years (2y), and the 5 years long term perspective (l).
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Figure 1: Std Deviation GDP, Inflation, Unemployment
Interpreting a high standard deviation as a high degree of uncertainty, I conclude that
uncertainty has been on an all-time high during the financial crisis only slowly recovering
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during the most recent years with values close to the pre-crisis level. This holds for every
variable of the SPF.
Interestingly, while one would expect long-term expectations to be more sluggish than
short-term forecasts, this fact holds only for the GDP series. As can be seen in the second
panel of Figure 1, the opposite is true for inflation expectations. Long-term uncertainty
(marked by diamonds) is relatively high compared to short-term uncertainty (marked
by asterisks).
It is important to notice that Figure 1 depicts standard deviations. Hence, one can
not conclude that short-term expectations of, say, inflation are low or lower than long-
term expectations. A high standard deviation reflects a severe divergence, whereas a
low standard deviation reflects a consonant appraisal of future rates among forecasters.
A possible interpretation for the high standard deviation during 2009 can be found
in Geiger and Sauter (2009) and Geiger et al. (2009). The rising standard deviation
could thus be the consequence of a break up between different camps of agents who
follow different approaches in predicting future developments. Those camps are nearly
congruent in calm times but break apart if things start shaking. The first camp consists
of agents who can be called “monetary believers”. They form expectations with a focus on
the monetary development. According to this position, the immense liquidity provision
on behalf of the ECB will lead into a rising inflation rate in the long run.
On the other hand, there is a second camp whose supporters focus their assessment
on “real” factors such as capital utilization or GDP growth. In their opinion, despite the
liquidity rush, the poor output development delivers no reason for inflationary pressure
in the future.
Despite the acceleration of uncertainty, measured by the standard deviation of fore-
casts, the mean forecast shows a different picture; see Figure 2. While short-term expec-
tations vary to some extent during the crisis, long-term expectations are well anchored.
This is true for GDP growth as well as for inflation. It is important to look at both mea-
sures, standard deviation and mean. A constant mean is in line with a high standard
deviation where extrema net each other out.
The constantly low mean of long-term expectations on inflation is striking. Given that
inflation is the main goal of the ECB and anchoring inflation expectations one of her
most precious achievements, one could attest the ECB a well done job. This anchoring of
long term expectations is even more impressive, given the beginning of the first cycle of
quantitative easing in fall 2008 with already high inflation expectations and the beginning
slowdown of the European economy.
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Figure 2: Mean GDP, Inflation, Unemployment
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Interestingly, unemployment shows some kind of a wave shape for all horizons. The
relative low expectations shifted upwards during the crisis but did not recover completely
afterwards – they have undergone a level shift.2
3.2 US Survey Data
For the US, Figure 3 and Figure 4 plot standard deviation and mean of real GDP,
inflation, and unemployment. The notation originates from the raw data set: The ab-
breviation (6) denotes the four quarter ahead forecast, the abbreviation 10 the ten years
ahead forecast, respectively.
Interpreting the US data is more difficult than the European data as the picture is
less uniform. Of course, one can identify the financial crisis, but even this outstanding
event is less obvious in the US data.
Standard deviation of real GDP growth expectations is marked by three significant
humps. The first hump is a heightened uncertainty due to the recession lasting from
March 2001 till November 2001, followed by the second hump in 2003 corresponding to
the corporate scandals and the beginning Iraq war. The last, most significant hike starts
2007 with the beginning of the financial crisis. During all these periods, uncertainty
about the ten year outlook remains quite low.
Inflation uncertainty seems to be rather erratic. Short and long-term uncertainty per-
form a slow acceleration starting around 2006. Albeit very speculative, this acceleration
could be due to the change of the chairman of the Federal Reserve (Bernanke succeeding
Greenspan).
Even though one can identify a peak of uncertainty during 2009, it is more or less
“one of many” humps regarding those last years. However, one important aspect is the
different scale of inflation uncertainty compared to the European figures. During the
crisis, US values are nearly twice the Europeans ones.
Taking into account the mean values, plotted in Figure 4, it looks like deflationary
scares such as 2003 and around 2009 come along with heightened uncertainty. Neverthe-
less, long-term expectations of inflation as well as real GDP seem to be well anchored.
Unemployment shows the same “wave” pattern as in Europe with uncertainty not fully
recovering to the pre-crisis level and a significant higher mean forecast.
2 This is of course plausible as unemployment is measured in levels, whereas GDP and inflation are
growth figures.
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Figure 3: Standard deviation of real GDP, inflation, and unemployment, US
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Figure 4: Mean of real GDP, inflation, and unemployment, US
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3.3 Comparison
For convenience, Figure 5 depicts US and EU data in one common plot. As can be seen,
GDP standard deviation in the US data is always greater than the European values. This
holds for the short and long-term perspective. However, a higher standard deviation can
also be attributed to generally higher values of US GDP growth expectations. Hence,
one should rather focus on the pattern then the absolute values. Concerning this, the –
compared to the US – steep acceleration of European uncertainty during the financial
crisis becomes evident. Long-term uncertainty remains low and less volatile in both
regions.
Inflation values till mid-2003 are very close. This changes at the beginning of 2004
with a general acceleration of uncertainty in the US, while European values remain on
a very low path. Only during the recent crisis those values have been risen but also
rebounded quite quickly.
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Figure 5: Standard deviation of (real) GDP and inflation, US and EU
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4 Uncertainty in US and EU Stock Market Indices
Figure 6 captures the VSTOXX and VIX developments, that is, the implied volatility
measure for the European and the US stock market, respectively. The picture corre-
sponds to the findings of the survey measures. What strikes most is the nearly perfect
synchronized course of both measures which already indicates a strong connection and
interrelation of the European and American stock market. A common global driver of
uncertainty seems to be very plausible.
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Figure 6: VIX (US), vstoxx (EU), daily
Compared to the survey measure, the stock market measure is more sensitive to un-
foreseen shocks. This may have various reasons. On the hand, this is simply due to the
fact that stock prices can and do change much faster than nearly every other economic
variable. They react immediately on incoming news which would fall into oblivion if con-
tracts could only be made on a quarterly basis. On the other hand, this may be merely
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owed to a technical issue. Stock market data is available on a daily basis. By squeez-
ing stock market data into a quarterly scheme, a smoother and less volatile picture is
achieved, which corresponds quite well to the survey based graphs presented above.
With the VIX and VSTOXX on hand, it is easy to recap past developments of the
last 10 years. Some crucial events are the first peak at the end of 2001 which is owed
to the terror attacks of September 11th. The following hump mid-2002 corresponds to
the corporate scandals in the US, followed by a little bit smaller hump associated with
the Iraq invasion in the first quarter of 2003 (Bekaert et al. 2010). Interestingly, during
those events uncertainty in the Euro Area was even higher than in the US.3
The second major group of events starts around 2008 with the collapse of Bear Stearns
followed by the second-to-none rise and fall in uncertainty due to the financial crisis and
the following (unconventional) measures undertaken by the Fed and the ECB. The last
humps, around mid 2010 and 2011 are owed to the so called Euro crisis reflecting the
risk of default in various European countries, most notably Greece.
These volatility index movements can be found in the survey data only to a very
limited extend. The reasons have been mentioned above. However, the rise due to the
financial crisis is also represented in the survey measures. Other peaks, such as those
around 2003 (corporate scandals and Iraq), are only very hard to detect in the survey
data. This is not astonishing or counterfactual as both measures, volatility index as
well as survey data, measure uncertainty but from a different perspective and data
basis. Survey measures display uncertainty about growth, inflation, and unemployment;
option volatility displays uncertainty about the stock market, which of course itself is
dependent on other underlying factors. Hence, not only the event per se is crucial but
also the central banks reaction and its further implications for macro variables.
5 Factor Analysis of Euro Data
In what follows, I first conduct a factor analysis of the European data and afterwards
the US data. The purpose is, to evaluate region specific factors and patterns. I will
show that uncertainty in Europe follows different patterns and forces than in the US.
In a third step, I combine both data sets to evaluate whether there exists something
3 One has to be careful in interpreting the VIX and VSTOXX as a solely uncertainty measure. Bekaert
et al. (2010) show how this measure can be decomposed into two components, namely, risk aversion
and uncertainty. This is due to the fact that both indices are stock market based, and thus also
harbor information about risk (aversion). However, this does not alter the findings above as the
volatility index is at least a good proxy for uncertainty.
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like a region independent, hence, common world uncertainty factor or if uncertainty is
somehow region driven.
Both measures – standard deviation and the volatility index – account for uncertainty.
As has been shown in the previous chapters, given that they show the same ups and
downs, stock market as well as survey based data seems to follow a common factor. It
appears that the common driving force behind these measures is some kind of “general
uncertainty”. This uncertainty can become visible with he help of factor analysis.
In general, factor analysis is a tool to reduce the complexity of a given data set. It
is utilized to extract a common, latent factor from the data such that movements in
various different variables can be explained by fewer factors, making a representation
and interpretation more convenient.
For the Euro area, my data set consists of variables taken from the SPF and the
VSTOXX; they are listed in Table 2. The last column gives the abbreviations used for
further analysis.
Stock market data VSTOXX vstoxx
Survey Data
GDP 1 year rolling gdp1
GDP 5 years ahead gdp5
Inflation 1 year rolling inf1
Inflation 5 years ahead inf5
Unemployment 1 year rolling une1
Unemployment 5 years ahead une5
Table 2: Data Set FA, EUR
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) criterion value is 0.75, “middling”4. All individual
measures of sampling adequacy (MSA) are at least greater than 0.6 and most of them
larger than 0.7. The only exception is the standard deviation of long-term GDP growth,
which is 0.22. Nevertheless, and for the sake of completeness, I keep this variable. In
order to find the right number of underlying driving factors, I follow Kaiser and Rice
(1974) and assume as many factors, as eigenvalues greater one. Two eigenvalues can be
identified which fulfill this criterion, hence, two common factors should be extracted.
4 Kaiser and Rice (1974) proposed a scale of sampling adequacy, according to values greater 0.5 are
said to be “miserable”, greater 0.6 “mediocre”, greater 0.7 “middling”, greater 0.8 “meritorious”,
and greater 0.9 “marvelous”. Values smaller than 0.5 are “unacceptable”.
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Variable Factor 1 Factor 2
vstoxx 0.6718 -
gdp1 0.9144 -
gdp5 - 0.4964
inf1 0.8537 -
inf5 - 0.9718
une1 0.9656 -
une5 - 0.5307
Table 3: Loadings EUR, Promax rotation (cropped)
Table 3 lists the respective factor loadings of the two factors. The loadings are gener-
ated using promax rotation with power 10.5 All values absolutely smaller than 0.4 have
been removed. The loadings are also plotted in Figure 7.
The promax rotation, opposed to the varimax rotation, is oblique. Hence, the extracted
factors are not orthogonal and thus not independent from each other. Using promax,
the loadings can also not be interpreted as correlations which is the case using varimax
rotation.
As can be seen very clearly even from Table 3, there is a distinction between long
term and short term expectations. All short term variables (gdp1, inf1 and une1), as
well as the volatility index (vstoxx) are loaded by Factor 1. Opposed to that, long-term
forecasts (gdp5, inf5 and une5) are loaded solely by Factor 2.
This loading patten is in line with an economic interpretation of a separation between
short and long-term drivers of uncertainty.6 Uncertainty about short-term inflation de-
velopment depends mainly on temporary shocks whereas uncertainty about inflation
development far in the future depends on the variance of permanent shocks (Ball et al.
1990).
However, the influence of the long-term factor is not as clear as it is for the short-term
figures. The more or less strict distinction of short and long-term drivers only holds for
inflation. Long-term unemployment as well as GDP growth are driven less intensive by
this second component. Long-term GDP growth is a difficult variable. It is little loaded
by Factor 2 and even less by Factor 1. Additionally, it exhibits a high specific variance
5 The varimax method delivers a very similar picture. For interpretation and presentation, however,
promax seems to be more appropriate in this case as it highlights the specific loadings more clearly.
6 See, for example, Caporale and Kontonikas (2006); Caporale et al. (2010) where the authors distin-
guish between the development of short-run and steady-state/long-run/structural inflation uncer-
tainty for different European countries.
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of approximately 0.82 which indicates that gdp5 is only to a very limited amount driven
by common factors.
Figure 7 shows Factor 1, which I declare as the short term uncertainty on the horizontal
axis. Long term uncertainty is plotted as Factor 2 on the vertical axis. The results of
the conducted factor analysis support the distinction in the literature between drivers
of short and long-term uncertainty.
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Figure 7: Loadings EU, promax rotation
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6 Factor Analysis of US Data
Analogously to the European analysis, the US data set is constituted by the SPF provided
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and the VIX provided by the Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE). Unfortunately – with the exception of inflation – for
the most variables the US survey only offers three horizons: 4 quarters ahead, annual
average current year and annual average next year. For factor analysis, I use the data
shown in Table 4. Except for the standard deviation of long-term inflation expectations,
all variables are the standard deviation of short-term forecasts, hence, the whole data
set covers rather short-term uncertainty.
Stock market data VIX V IX
Survey Data
Inflation 1 year rolling CPI(6)
Inflation 10 years ahead CPI10
Real Consumption 1 year rolling RCONSUM(6)
Real GDP 1 year rolling RGDP (6)
Unemployment 1 year rolling UNEMP (6)
Table 4: Data Set US
I conduct the varimax rotation which is an orthogonal rotation. The extracted fac-
tors are thus independent from each other. Nevertheless, the results using promax are
comparable.
The KMO offers a value of 0.75 which is according to Kaiser and Rice (1974) “mid-
dling”. All MSA values are at least larger than 0.5, hence “acceptable”. Further, two
eigenvalues larger then one can be identified which calls for two factors to be extracted.
The loadings are given in Table 5 where all values smaller than 0.17 have been removed
for convenience.
According to Table 5, stock market volatility, real consumption and real GDP are
solitary loaded by Factor 1. Inflation uncertainty – short and long-term – are loaded
solitary by Factor 2. Unemployment uncertainty seems to be nearly equally dependent
on both factors.
Analogous to the Euro area, stock market and short-run GDP uncertainty are loaded
by one common factor which also drives real consumption. Also, short-run uncertainty
concerning unemployment is driven by this factor to some extent. Opposed to the Euro-
pean data, short-run unemployment uncertainty is also driven by a second factor. This
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Variable Factor 1 Factor 2
V IX 0.8195 -
CPI(6) - 0.7793
CPI10 - 0.7661
RCONSUM(6) 0.8484 -
RGDP (6) 0.8877 -
UNEMP (6) 0.7244 0.6256
Table 5: Loadings US, varimax rotation (cropped)
was not the case for the Euro area, where I discriminated between a short and long-term
prospects.
Most importantly, the strong distinction between short and long-term uncertainty
of inflation expectations can not be found in the US data. Both inflation horizons are
loaded by the same factor. Hence, the distinction made for the European data, which was
encouraged by the literature (Caporale and Kontonikas 2006; Caporale et al. 2010) can
not be approved for the US data with the use of factor analysis. Moreover, as varimax
is an orthogonal rotation, that is, both factors are independent from each other, there is
a strong difference between long and short-term inflation uncertainty on the one hand
and (nearly) all other variables on the other hand.
To conclude, for the Euro area there is a distinction concerning the loadings between
long-term and short-term uncertainty especially for inflation but also GDP and un-
employment which is also reinforced by the existing literature. The US factor analysis
suggests no distinction between long and short-term uncertainty about inflation. Much
more there is a “classical” distinction between uncertainty about monetary values – no
matter what time aspect – and “real” variables including stock market uncertainty.
19
2001
−0.5
0
0.5
1
RCONSUM(6)
RGDP(6)
VIX
UNEMP(6)
Factor 1
CPI10
CPI(6)
Rotation: varimax
Fa
ct
or
 2
Figure 8: Loadings US, varimax rotation
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7 Is Uncertainty Driven by the Same Latent Factors in US and
the Euro zone
After both regions have been analyzed separately, now a global factor analysis is con-
ducted. The goal is to identify whether Europe and the United States obey one common
factor in terms of uncertainty or if uncertainty is region driven. If there exists some-
thing like a “global US-Euro uncertainty” this would also give evidence for a common,
strongly connected market in which for example GDP growth can no longer be treated
as an independent, region or country-specific variable.
For the global factor analysis, both data sets are combined. Due to the poor MSA
value of US unemployment and long term European GDP growth, I have dropped those
values. The remaining eleven variables exhibit an MSA value at least greater than 0.5
and are listed in Table 6. The overall KMO criterion is 0.8, “meritorious”.
Stock market data VSTOXX vstoxxVIX V IX
Survey Data US
Inflation 1 year rolling CPI(6)
Inflation 10 years ahead CPI10
Real Consumption 1 year rolling RCONSUM(6)
Real GDP 1 year rolling RGDP (6)
Survey Data EUR
GDP 1 year rolling gdp1
Inflation 1 year rolling inf1
Inflation 5 years ahead inf5
Unemployment 1 year rolling une1
Unemployment 5 years ahead une5
Table 6: Data Set FA, US & EUR
The analysis with the help of the eigenvalue criterion suggests three common factors
loading uncertainty in the US and Europe. The loadings produced by varimax rotation
are listed in Table 7 and Figure 9. The upper panel shows US, the lower panel Euro Zone
loadings. Figure 7 captures all values from both regions. For clarity, Figure 8 displays
only those values greater than 0.3. The last column always displays the specific variance.
I declare Factor 1 as “international stock market uncertainty factor”. The highest
loadings on this factor are given by the US and European Stock market indices V IX
and vstoxx. Both loadings are greater than 0,9. Additionally, the specific variances are
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Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 specific variance
V IX 0.9839 0.1462 0.0743 0.0050
CPI(6) -0.0342 0.0853 0.9604 0.0692
CPI(10) 0.1603 0.0814 0.6227 0.5799
RCONSUM(6) 0.6467 0.3967 0.2188 0.3766
RGDP (6) 0.6500 0.4849 0.1714 0.3130
vstoxx 0.9183 0.1896 -0.0201 0.1203
gdp1 0.4527 0.7947 0.2532 0.0994
inf1 0.4771 0.6165 0.3886 0.2414
inf5 0.0878 0.6633 0.0712 0.5472
une1 0.4747 0.7869 0.2754 0.0796
une5 0.1337 0.7917 -0.0927 0.3467
Table 7: Loadings US & EUR, Varimax rotation
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 specific variance
V IX 0.9839 - - 0.0050
CPI(6) - - 0.9604 0.0692
CPI(10) - - 0.6227 0.5799
RCONSUM(6) 0.6467 0.3967 - 0.3766
RGDP (6) 0.6500 0.4849 - 0.3130
vstoxx 0.9183 - - 0.1203
gdp1 0.4527 0.7947 - 0.0994
inf1 0.4771 0.6165 0.3886 0.2414
inf5 - 0.6633 - 0.5472
une1 0.4747 0.7869 - 0.0796
une5 - 0.7917 - 0.3467
Table 8: Loadings US & EUR, Varimax rotation (cropped)
very small. A specific variance of zero would indicate that the respective variable is solely
driven by the common factors. I return to the other variables loaded by Factor 1 later.
Factor 2 is the “European uncertainty factor”. Besides the stock market index, all other
European variables no matter if long or short-term are loaded by this latent force. Espe-
cially uncertainty about GDP and unemployment is compared to inflation higher loaded
by this factor. I would thus refine the factor as “European real variables uncertainty
factor”.
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Factor 3 is a “US inflation uncertainty factor” as it especially loads the uncertainty
concerning short and long-term US inflation and hardly anything else.
Despite those strict mono-causal explanations, there are several connections. For ex-
ample, Factor 1 is not only loaded by stock market data but – to a smaller extent – also
by US real variables RGDP (6) and RCONSUM(6). Hence, uncertainty concerning the
stock market is somehow connected to uncertainty about the real development of the
US economy and to a smaller extent short-term European developments.
Furthermore, most of the variables loaded mainly by Factor 2 also account for Factor
1, though to a smaller amount. Interestingly, this holds especially for the short-term
variables gdp1, inf1 and une1. Uncertainty about long-term developments in Europe are
not driven by “US uncertainty”. On the other hand, Factor 2 also drives uncertainty
about short-term US developments. Hence, there is a connection in terms of uncertainty
between the US and Europe, but rather on a short-term basis. Uncertainty about the
expected long-term development, however, is not; it is region driven.
Factor 3 should be refined into ‘US short-term inflation uncertainty factor”. Given
the data set, short-term inflation uncertainty reveals the second highest loading of the
data set. It also confirms the previous finding (see Table 5), whereas US inflation is
independent of any other variable. However, long-term inflation uncertainty (CPI10)
must be taken critical as it also shows a high specific variance of nearly 60%. But in
fact, this third factor also loads European short-term inflation uncertainty which again
indicates a strong connection between both economic regions.
The previous pattern of a short–long distinction for the European data and a real–
monetary distinction of the US data fades. This is particularly true for the European
analysis. As before, the US data still provides a distinction between real (Factor 1) and
monetary values (Factor 2) which reminds of the classical dichotomy. On the other hand,
the sharp distinction between short and long-term uncertainty of the European data can
not be found for the global factor analysis. All values are loaded by the same factor,
Factor 2, no matter their forecast horizon.
Reasons for these findings may arise out of the differences between the leading policy
actors of both regions. When compared to the Federal Reserve System, the ECB is a
young institution. Taken the classical dichotomy literally, the US have achieved a long-
run situation with an independency of monetary and real variables, a distinction which
does not yet hold for the European economies.
Additionally, the Fed only in charge of price stability and not mandated to promote
maximum employment and moderate long-term interest rates. Hence, the different un-
certainty forces of real and monetary values could originate from the threefold mandate
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of the Fed whereas the common European factor indicates the unique price stability goal
of the ECB. If so, one must admit that the public obviously does not believe in a control
of the stock market on behalf of the ECB and thus uncertainty concerning the stock
market is driven by a non-European, hence American, force.
8 Conclusion
This paper attempted an exploration of uncertainty during the last decade with the help
of an explanatory factor analysis. Using data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(US and Europe) and stock market volatility measured by the VIX/VSTOXX indices,
the US as well as the Euro Zone have first been investigated separately and later on
jointly.
The European survey data indicates low uncertainty during the pre-crisis years, as
measured by the standard deviation of forecasts. All variables show an acceleration
of uncertainty during the crisis over nearly all forecast horizons. Nevertheless, mean
expectations remain nearly constant or at least quickly return to their pre-crisis values.
For the US survey data, an acceleration of inflation uncertainty can be found, starting
around 2006. This is true for short and long-term expectations. Additionally, deflationary
tendencies seem to promote a rise in uncertainty. Stock market data shows a nearly
perfect synchronized run of both economic regions.
For the Euro Zone, factor analysis shows a clear separation between uncertainty con-
cerning short-term forecasts and uncertainty concerning long-term forecasts. This holds
more or less for all variables taken into account and is especially pronounced for inflation
expectations. This finding is in line with other research whereby short-term inflation un-
certainty is driven by temporary shocks and long-term uncertainty by permanent shocks.
According to my findings, this result can be assigned to a lesser amount also to other
variables such as GDP growth or unemployment expectations.
In contrast to the European findings of a short and long-term factor, US factor anal-
ysis delivers a rather “classical” distinction between “real” and “monetary” factors. On
the one hand, there is a factor that drives short and long-term inflation uncertainty
while, on the other hand, uncertainty concerning stock market movements as well as
real consumption and GDP growth are governed by a different factor. Unemployment
seems to be somewhat in-between.
Combining both data sets yields three distinct factors which load the uncertainty mea-
sures. Firstly there exists an international stock market uncertainty factor which loads
especially the VIX and VSTOXX and to a smaller extent real US variables. Secondly
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an European uncertainty factor can be identified, loading mainly European uncertainty
measures disregarding the forecast horizon. Thirdly, as the US analysis already revealed,
US short and long-term inflation uncertainty follows a distinct common factor which
only to a very limited amount affects also Euro inflation uncertainty. Reasons for these
patterns may be found in the different policy mandates as well as the unequal age of the
monetary institutions here and abroad.
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